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Abstract
This paper analyzes the performance of Indian banks over the period of the last ten years. It uses
the CAMEL Framework to determine the performance of public and private banks in India. The
paper also conducts an empirical analysis to determine the share price performance of Indian
banks relative to the share price performance of banks in Hong Kong, Europe and the US. This
paper finds that private banks perform better than public banks overall based on the CAMEL
Framework. In addition it also finds that the Indian banks share price performance is dependent
on the share price performance of Hong Kong and European banks, and it has a significant
positive relationship with the overall Hong Kong stock market, and this relationship strengthens
after 2007. On the whole, this paper seeks to offer as comprehensive a perspective as possible
upon the conduct, structure and performance of the banking industry of India.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the last decade the banking industry of India has experienced exponential growth. The
CNX Bank Index1 has grown by more than 1100% in absolute terms, and at a compounded
annual growth rate of over 25% in the period from 2000 – 2010, while the Sensex2 grew at a
compounded annual growth rate of 14%. In the year 2010 the banking sector contributed
16.35% to the GDP of India.3 This calls for an analysis of the performance of Indian banks.
The reforms of 1991 and 1998 have helped improve the performance, profitability and
efficiency of the Indian banking system. Prior studies have shown the effectiveness of the
reforms on Indian banks in helping improve total factor productivity, efficiency and profitability
among other things. Much less has been done to examine how the banking industry of India has
fared compared to other countries in recent years. In addition, there is insufficient published
research on the performance of the public and private banks in the wake of the financial crisis,
which is a true litmus test. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the growth of the banking
sector of India, starting in the 21st century. The analysis is conducted in two parts: (1)
examination of the performance of private and public banks in India in the last ten years and (2)
comparison of the performance of the Indian banking sector share price performance to the
banking sectors and overall market indices of other developed and developing countries over the
last ten years.

1

CNX Bank Index is an index including the most liquid and large capitalized Indian Banking stocks trading on the
National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India (NSE India).
2
Benchmark index of the Bombay Stock Exchange comprising of 30 most actively traded stocks and is calculated
on the free float capitalization method (Bloomberg).
3
All data is from Reserve Bank of India and Bloomberg
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The second chapter of the paper describes the evolution of the banking industry in India
starting from the early 18th century. This chapter then explains the rationale for the two waves of
nationalization and the reforms of the banking system. After that, this chapter examines the
liberalization of the banking industry and the effects of ownership on the management, efficiency
and profitability of the banks.
The third chapter of this paper explains the specific reforms enacted by the government in
1991 and in 2000. It then provides evidence on the effectiveness of these reforms, drawing from
existing literature on this topic. This chapter also analyzes the effects of the reforms on the
profitability of banks by performing a multivariate regression on the profitability ratios of both
public and private banks for twenty years (1990 – 2009). In addition it analyzes the performance
of private and public banks in India during the ten year period from 2000 – 2010 using the
CAMEL framework.4 This section then delves into the analysis of these performance indicators,
before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2008.
The fourth chapter of this paper compares the Indian banking sector‟s share price
performance to banking sector share prices in other developing and developed countries. Hong
Kong, Europe and the US are the three regions to which the paper compares the Indian banking
industry. It assesses how the CNX Bank index tracks the stock markets and the performance of
other countries banking indices. This chapter also performs a multivariate regression on the CNX
Bank index as the dependent variable to see how it tracks the banking indices of the other
countries and how the overall stock markets of these countries affect the CNX Bank index.

4

The CAMEL Framework is a bank rating system that analyzes bank performance by measuring five factors:
Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earning, and Liquidity.

2

On the whole, this paper seeks to offer as comprehensive a perspective as possible upon
the conduct, structure and performance of the banking industry of India.

3

Chapter 2: Banking History of India
Mr. W.E. Preston, member of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance,
said “It may be accepted that a system of banking that was eminently suited to India‟s then
requirements was in force in that country many centuries before the science of banking became
an accomplished fact in England.”(Saunders 1931) An extensive banking system has existed in
India for many centuries. Chanakya, one of the most prominent political philosophers in India,
wrote in the 4th century B.C., “The nature of transactions between creditors and debtors on which
the welfare of the kingdom depends, shall always be scrutinized.”(Shamastry 2009) In addition
there are references to agricultural loans, deposit rules and lending rules (Mookerji 1988).
Chanakya had also laid down regulations and procedures for banks if they were undergoing
liquidation as early as 4th Century B.C.
The first joint stock bank in India was the Bank of Bombay established in 1720 in
Mumbai, failing shortly afterwards (Reserve Bank of India, 2008a). Calcutta was a major trading
center in India, because of the establishment of the headquarters of the East India Company there
by the British. This led to the growth of banking services in that city. The first bank established
in Calcutta was the Bank of Hindustan in 1770, which was established by an agency house but
closed in 1832 (Saunders 1931). Presidency Banks in India were banks that were incorporated by
a royal charter and acted as quasi central banks. The Bank of Bengal established on June 2nd,
1806 with a capital of Rs. 5 million was the first Presidency Bank in India. By 1843 three
Presidency Banks had been established, in Calcutta, Mumbai and Madras. These were governed
by royal charters and had the ability to issue notes; however the Paper Currency Act (1861)
transferred this privilege to the government in 1867 (Reserve Bank of India 2011). In 1850 the
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Companies Act was established, which stipulated unlimited liability for the banks. An
amendment in 1867 permitted the principle of limited liability, which increased the number of
banks in existence (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). These banks were organized as private
shareholding companies with Europeans as the majority shareholders. In addition to the
Presidency Banks, private banks were slowly coming into existence. These private banks were
not governed by a royal charter and did not have the ability to issue notes.
A group of Europeans founded the Allahabad Bank in 1865, which is the oldest joint
stock company in existence today. The other two big banks founded under private ownership
were the Punjab National Bank in 1895 in Lahore and the Bank of India in 1906 in Mumbai. All
these three banks are still in existence today (Reserve Bank of India, 2008a). The Swadeshi
movement of 1906 was aimed at making India self reliant as a country and to be used as a
mechanism to oust the British. Swadeshi means self-sufficiency and the movement provided a
great impetus to joint stock banks of Indian ownership and about five more Indian owned banks
came into existence. However in spite of the establishment of other banks, the banking sector
was dominated by Presidency Banks measured in terms of paid up capital and deposits. As can
be seen from Figure 2.1 even though the number of commercial banks increased from two to
eighteen, the increase in deposits was still nominal and the three Presidency Banks still held
majority of the deposits. The gap between the deposits increased in the period from 1910-1913.
The Swadeshi movement did increase the reach of co-operative banks in the country (Reserve
Bank of India 2008a). It also increased the number of deposits in the banks. If we look closely at
Figure 2.1, we notice that the number of deposits from 1900 to 1910 more than double from their
previous amount. One reason that might account for the increase in the number of deposits could
be the switch of the Indian currency standard from silver to gold in 1894 (Burdekin, Mitchener,
5

and Weidenmer 2011). This shift also closely followed the end of the worldwide deflation in the
1890‟s.

Figure 2.1 Deposits in Banks (Millions of Rupees)
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Before the establishment of the Companies Act (1913), many companies registered
themselves as banks and had low paid up capital, and small reserves. These entities, which were
operating as banking companies had a very low proportion of cash and other liquid assets as
compared to their total assets, leading to many bank failures. Bank failures in India during this
time were attributed to individual imprudence, manipulation of accounts by managers and
incompetent management. From 1913 -1914 the number of failed banks increased from twelve to
forty two (Reserve Bank of India 1954). Cooperative banks being based on a mutual trust
system, experienced fewer failures. Shortly after World War I ended, in 1921 the government
merged the three Presidency Banks to form the Imperial Bank of India. The Imperial Bank of
India performed three main functions: (1) commercial banking, (2) central banking, and (3) the
role of the banker to the government. Due to lack of regulation by 1930, the number of
institutions in the banking sector that were registered under the Companies Act (1913) increased
to 1,258 institutions (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). The Great Depression soon came along and
had a huge impact on the Indian financial sector with the collapse of 51 banks in 1935 (Reserve
Bank of India, 2008a). The Great Depression precipitated the creation of the Indian Central
6

Banking Inquiry Committee in 1929 to measure and analyze the problems that were deep rooted
in the Indian Banking System. The Committee called for the establishment of a central bank and
the incorporation of some extra provisions in the Companies Act of 1913.
The report by the Indian Central Banking Inquiry Committee was taken seriously, and led
to the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934) which established the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in
1935. The act gave the bank powers to regulate the banking system of the nation. The four main
functions of the Reserve Bank are: (1) banker to the government of India, (2) issue notes, (3) acts
as a banker to banks, and (4) to maintain the exchange ratio (Reserve Bank of India 2009).
However, the Reserve Bank of India did not have sufficient powers to be able to regulate the
economy and the monetary system. For example the permission of the Reserve Bank was not
needed to set up a new bank (Reserve Bank of India, 2009). Commercial banks were governed
by the Companies Act applicable to ordinary companies as well. In addition, there existed a free
entry and free exit system for the establishment of banks, which led to a substantial increase in
the total number of banks in operation. In 1940 the number of scheduled and non-scheduled
commercial banks that were registered was 654 (Reserve Bank of India, 2008a). Indian financial
markets were facing many problems under this extreme laissez-faire economy, featuring massive
bank failures and governance issues. Figure 2.2 shows the number of bank failures in India
during that time frame. The Reserve Bank of India submitted a proposal to the Central
Government for implementing new banking legislations arguing that the main cause of bank
failures was lack of regulation. The Indian Companies Act (1913) was established to ensure a
stable financial system; however, the Indian Companies Act (1913) did not govern banks
differently as compared to other organizations and had many other inefficiencies and loopholes
in it. The Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, (1936) now included a provision for separate
7

regulation and governance of banking companies. It included provisions on minimum capital,
and cash reserve requirements, among others. After a few years of its implementation, a sharp
decline in the number of bank failures can be noticed from 117 bank failures in 1939, to 50 bank
failures in 1942. There was also a sharp increase in the number of bank failures in the period of
the Second World War in the period before independence; however the average number of bank
failures declined after independence as displayed by Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2 Number of Bank Failures
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Four years after the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India, World War II impacted
the financial sector evermore than the Great Depression or World War I; however this effect was
more positive than negative and it led to rapid branch expansion from 1940-1945. Due to
government expenditure on defense and supplies, some sections of the economy experienced
growth in income and this led to an increase in the deposit pool of banks and fostered
development of the banking system; in particular it led to the expansion of the already existing
networks of banks.
In 1947 India gained its independence and the five main banks in India were: Central
Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, United Commercial Bank, Bank of Baroda, and Bank of
India. In 1947 India also underwent partition, causing India and Pakistan to become two separate
countries. The partition particularly affected the bigger banks. The year 1948 was definitely a
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brutal one for India as 45 banks (from more than 637 banks) failed with paid up capital
averaging Rs. 0.4 million (Reserve Bank of India 2008a).
The Reserve Bank of India had a mammoth task waiting for it after India gained its
independence. It had to restore a sound banking system. According to Governor C.D. Deshmukh,
the then Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, “the difficulty of the task of the Reserve Bank
of India in dealing with the banking system in this country does not lie in the multiplicity of
banking units alone. It is aggravated by its diversity and range. There can be no standard
treatment in practice although the same theory governs all” (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). India
had enjoyed a lassiez-faire system, which was not as well suited to a period when the economy
was not developed. It was unclear whether social control was required or whether the markets
should be liberalized and not so regulated. Economic development required banking services to
be available to each person in the society; whereas, services were actually heavily concentrated
in trade centers. Out of the 637 commercial banks in India in 1947, 200 were in Madras, 106
were in West Bengal and 40 were in Mumbai. This left only 291 banks to cover all the rest of
India (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). However, before expansion of the banking system, the
government had to ensure a stable financial system. This led to the creation of the Banking
Regulations Act (1949), which came into effect on March 16th, 1949 (Banking Regulation Act
1949). The act formed separate legislation for companies operating as banks. It also vested the
RBI with further powers such as: (1) control over opening new banks and branches, (2) power to
inspect books of the companies that qualified as banks under this act, (3) prevent voluntary
winding up of licensed banking companies, (4) regularly reporting financial statements to the
Reserve Bank of India. In addition to granting and vesting the RBI with further powers, other
important regulations that were put in action were: (1) protecting the interests of depositors, (2)

9

rules relating to paid up capital, and reserves. There were various other rules, relating to
organization, management, and liquidation of banking companies. However, this act had some
limitations. It did not provide protection against abuse of power by management, which had
caused massive bank failures in the past. Nevertheless, bank failures were reduced after the
establishment of the Banking Companies Act (1949), falling from an average of 47 bank failures
in 1941-1949 to 37 bank failures in 1950-1955 (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). The decline is
also noticeable in Figure 2.2 above, where the graph smoothens after 1949.
The first step the RBI took after Independence was consolidation of banks, either
merging smaller entities or liquidating them. The Banking Companies Act, (1961) amended the
Banking Regulation Act, 1961 and sought to “facilitate expeditious payments to the depositors of
banks in liquidation” (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). It also vested the Reserve Bank of India
with extra powers to help banks in times of financial crisis. During 1954-1959 approximately
106 banks were liquidated. Of these 73 underwent voluntary liquidation and 33 were forced to
undergo liquidation (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). This led to massive consolidation in the
banking industry. The powers of the RBI increased after 1960 to: (1) make surprise inspection of
banks and branches, to better determine fraudulent activities, (2) have power to make
appointments and remove executive personnel in banks‟ and, (3) restrict on banks‟ loans and
advances (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). Legislation regarding banking had stronger
enforcement and establishment after 1960.
With the extension of the RBI‟s powers and a more solid foundation of legislation for the
banking industry, it was time to expand the reach of the banking sector. The Imperial Bank of
India was given a target to open 114 offices within five years (Reserve Bank of India 2008a).
The agricultural sector had been left behind in India‟s banking development. As per the All India
10

Rural Credit Survey Committee commercial banks only provided 0.9% of the total volume of
advances and loans to the agricultural sector (Reserve Bank of India 2008a). Rural India
continued to rely mostly on moneylenders that charged them very high interest rates on their
loans. The government had to make some major changes to promote equal socio-economic
development. The Government of India nationalized the Imperial Bank of India, with the
purpose of, “extension of banking facilities on a large scale, more particularly in the rural and
semi-urban areas, and for diverse other public purposes.” The State Bank of India Act (1955)
renamed the Imperial Bank of India as the State Bank of India (SBI). However to prevent it from
being under administrative pressure its ownership was vested with the RBI. SBI underwent rapid
expansion and opened 416 branches in 5 years all over the country (Reserve Bank of India
2008a). The security that the government owned SBI helped it compete against deposits in „safe
avenues‟ such as the post offices and savings at home. Five years later in 1960 eight more banks
were nationalized and they formed the subsidiaries of the State Bank of India. With the
nationalization of these eight banks one third of the banking sector was under the direct control
of the government. The Indian banking system had made considerable progress since
independence: (1) bank failures had decreased, (2) bank presence in the country increased, (3)
banking legislation had a stronger foundation, and (4) deposits had increased. However, the
benefits had still not flowed in their entirety to the general public, because credit was not
reaching sectors that most needed it, and the banking industry did not have a national presence,
because of its concentration in metropolitan and urban areas.
On December 1967, through the Banking Laws Amendment Act (Reserve Bank of India
2008a), the idea of social control was introduced. The main objective of social control was to
achieve: (1) bank credit allocation to the right sectors, (2) prevent misuse of bank funds, and (3)
11

use banks to promote and help finance socio-economic development. The National Credit
Council was established in 1968 to help allocate credit according to the Five Year Plan priorities.
In 1969 by putting into effect the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Ordinance, fourteen banks were nationalized.
Nationalization led to major structural changes in the banking sector of India. Branch
expansion was accompanied by development of priority sectors of the economy, with credit
being directed towards these sectors contrary to profit motives of the banks. The Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. was established for providing guarantees against the risk of
default in payment, which increased the number of loans to smaller borrowers by the banks. The
number of rural bank offices increased from 1,443 branches in 1969 to 19,453 branches in 1981
(Reserve Bank of India 2008a). The amount of credit outstanding increased from Rs. 1.15 billion
in 1969 to Rs. 36 billion in 1981, which accounted for 11.9% of the total loans to the rural areas
(Reserve Bank of India 2008a). RBI was monitoring the economy by controlling and changing
micro factors affecting banks, to prevent banking failures during crises. In April 1980, there was
a second wave of nationalization when an additional six banks were nationalized. All these banks
had deposit liabilities of Rs. 2 billion or more. The number of public sector banks reached
twenty, representing 92% of the deposits of the banking sector. The government increased the
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR).5 Banks were earning less
than the market rate eligible on CRR balances and yield on government securities was lower than
5

Cash Reserve Ratio has been described as the amount of cash “Scheduled Commercial Banks are required to maintain with
RBI an average cash balance, the amount of which shall not be less than three per cent of the total of the Net Demand and Time
Liabilities (NDTL) in India, on a fortnightly basis and RBI is empowered to increase the said rate of CRR to such higher rate not
exceeding twenty percent of the NDTL” under the RBI Act, 1934.
Statutory Liquidity Ratio has been described as “All Scheduled Commercial Banks in addition to the average daily balance
which they (banks) are supposed to maintain under Section 42 of the RBI Act (CRR) are required to maintain in India, a) in cash
b) in gold valued at a price not exceeding the current market price c) in unencumbered approved securities valued at a price as
specified by the RBI from time to time, an amount of which shall not, at the close of the business of any day be less than 25
percent or such other percentage not exceeding 40 percent” as the RBI may from time to time specify in the Gazette of India of
the total liabilities and demands of these banks as on the last Friday of the preceding fortnight.
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the interest rate paid by the banks on deposits. The nationalization phase was marked by
stringent controls on the banking industry. As of September 22nd, 1990 the Cash Reserve Ratio
was 15.00% and the Statutory Liquidity Ratio was 38.5% (Reserve Bank of India), combined
they amounted to 53.5% of all demands and liabilities being saved in liquid government
securities or as cash with the RBI. The banks were being used by the government to fund their
projects for economic development. This led the banks to be unprofitable forcing the government
to adopt changes and thus, came about the reforms of 1991 led by the Narasimham Committee.
There are two main approaches to banking regulation. One endpoint is government
ownership of the banking industry and the other endpoint is free banking system. Barth, Caprio
and Levine (2008) describe the two main approaches as the “Public Interest Approach” and the
“Private Interest View of Regulation.” In India up until 1991 there was an increased amount of
government regulation in the banking industry, and social control over the banks was mandated
successful. Social control in banking would realize if the banks to manage to allocate resources
efficiently while mobilizing credit in all sectors including the marked out priority sectors. Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2008) define socially efficient as, “that the banking system allocates
resources in a way that maximizes output, while minimizing variance, and is distributionally
preferred.” The government of India initially put in process the policy of social control to help
regulate, stabilize and expand the banking system. The government had good intentions, and it
led to a banking system that spanned across the nation and was undergoing fewer banking
failures, and actually making profits while lending to priority sectors. The second round of
nationalization that incorporated six more banks, and increased government regulation, made the
banking system very inefficient and unprofitable; Joshi and Little (1997) said, “By 1991, the
country had erected an unprofitable, inefficient, and financially unsound banking sector.”
13

Therefore even though deposits increased, profitability decreased, and the average return on
assets from 1984-1994 was -0.33% due to two losses in 1993 and 1994, excluding those losses
we see that the average return on assets in the 1980‟s is 0.11% (Joshi and Little, 1997). It was not
government ownership, but government‟s stringent regulation on the banking system, that
decreased profitability. McKinnon and Shaw mention that high reserve requirements, interest
rate floors and ceilings, and lending to priority sectors, as a large percentage of total lending is
“harmful for resource mobilization and resource allocation.” King and Levine (1993) state, that
government intervention in the financial system has a negative effect on the equilibrium growth.
Even if the government has no wrong intentions, it might just be unable, incompetent and
incapable to run the banking system of the country. Effective regulation in the 1960‟s led to a
decrease in banking failure. However repressive government policies made effective regulation
impossible and Barth, Caprio and Levine‟s (2008) “ineffective hand view” states that “even if
governments demonstrate exemplary integrity, official regulation might be generally ineffective
at actually easing market failures.”
The counterview of the “public interest approach” is based in two main assumptions (1)
there are market failures (2) the government has incentives and power to reduce these market
failures. The Private Interest View of regulation states that the second assumption does not hold.
However Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have viewed regulation by the government as
counterproductive and point to “regulatory capture.” In banking government intervention may
funnel resources towards sectors that are historically proven to be unprofitable but need capital to
grow and don‟t have access to it because of their unprofitability.
There are various ways a government can interfere with the banking system of an
economy, and the Indian government, participated in all the below mentioned measures. Barth,
14

Caprio and Levine (2008) outline the main ones as: (1) restrictions on banks, (2) entry
restrictions, (3) capital requirements, (4) supervisory powers, (5) safety net support, (6) market
monitoring and (7) government ownership.
(1) Restrictions on Banks: It can be in the form of activity restrictions. It is critical to impose
activity restrictions on banks, and that helps define the term bank. Regulatory restrictions can
decrease efficiency of the banks and reduces their ability to diversify their income streams and
decrease overall risk of operations. A cross country data study by Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2001) finds that greater regulatory restrictions lead to a higher probability of a country suffering
from a major bank crisis and lower banking sector efficiency. The Indian banks operated under
many regulatory restrictions which limited their activities in off balance sheet activities.
(2) Entry restriction: Governments have control over the banking system by regulating the entry
of new private and foreign banks. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) have performed studies that
suggest when US created a more competitive environment by removing branching restrictions,
“the rate of economic growth within those states accelerated and quality of bank lending
improved.” The Indian government had placed restrictions on entry of foreign banks and private
banks. These banks required government licenses to operate in India. In 1993 the RBI permitted
private entry into the banking sector, but imposed restrictions on branch expansion. Various
studies have shown that entry restrictions are not favorable for the banking industry and for the
overall economy.
(3) Capital Requirements: In addition to entry restrictions, governments can enforce regulations
on minimum capital requirements. It can affect risk taking activities and it helps create a pseudo
cushion in times of crisis. However, proponents of the private management of banks disagree
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with the benefits derived from imposition of capital requirements by the government. Studies on
this topic by various authors such as Genotte and Pyle (1991), Lam and Chen (1985), and
Besanko and Kanatas (1996) all suggest that “higher capital requirements might increase risk
taking behavior.” It could be that the size of the balance sheet decreases and banks could
undertake riskier activities under limited liability. In addition studies done by Gorton and Winton
(1999) show that the higher the capital requirements imposed by the government the higher is the
cost of capital. The Indian government had imposed capital restrictions on the new private
banks.
(4) Supervisory Powers and Market Monitoring: It can be combined into one category and it
refers to official supervision of banking activities in the country. Developing countries usually
have directed credit programs and high reserve and liquidity requirements, this helps provide a
cushion in times of crisis and as they liberalize these requirements, the banks need to have proper
supervision of their activities. However, the private interest view argues otherwise. However
there are not many studies on this that promote either view. The private interest view argues that
excessive supervision can lead to corruption by government officials. It also says that
government employees have no motivation to work in the government as the government pays
them lesser than private banks and they would be willing to take bribes to produce a good report
on a bank. India has instituted agencies that monitor banks‟ performance. RBI also has
supervisory powers and it places them in effect by looking at the financial statements of banks on
a regular basis through the course of the year.
(5) “Safety Net Support”: It has two main parts, one being the “lender of the last resort” and the
other an “explicit deposit insurance system.” Proponents of the private interest view feel that it is
a moral hazard and present several other ways to protect small depositors. The view states that
16

due to the presence of deposit insurance depositors monitor bank performance lesser and that
reduces risk premium in their cost of funds. The Indian government has a deposit insurance
scheme in place along with the establishment of the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India.
(7) Government Ownership: This is the other extreme pole of view for the two views of banking
regulation. According to the private interest view, the government does not have enough
incentives, to lead investments to socially required sectors, which need credit to grow. Instead it
ensures the funding of politically beneficial projects, even though they might be non performing
assets in the long run. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), state that “greater government
ownership is generally associated with less-efficient and less well-developed financial systems.”
The academic discussion reinforces the need for the liberalization of the banking industry
in India. A Committee on the Financial System was instituted by the government in 1990,
headed by Shri M. Narasimham. The Committee‟s report to the parliament formed the basis for
most of the ensuing regulatory changes in India. The committee asked for the following
measures to be taken by the Government of India: (1) reducing the current (1990) rate of CRR
and SLR for the banks, (2) slowly decreasing the percentage of directed credit to priority sectors,
(3) interest rate determination should be done by markets and not the government, (4) structural
reorganization of the banking sector, (5) development of an asset reconstruction fund to help
tackle the issue of non –performing assets, (6) removal of control of the banking system from the
Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance, and that (7) public sector banks should be free and
autonomous, in order to operate effectively in a competitive environment. Some, not all of these
recommendations were accepted by the Government of India and later became reforms in the
banking industry.
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In 1998 the Committee submitted another report with further changes to the banking
sector. This report was focused more on bank legislation and the expansion and growth of the
banking industry. The main reforms suggested were as follows: (1) healthier and stronger
financial system in India, which can handle problems regarding liquidity and exchange rate
fluctuations, (2) “Narrow Banking Concept” was recommended where weak banks with high
non-performing assets (NPA‟s) can only make safe investments, (3) increase in the capital
adequacy ratio requirement, (4) review of functions of the board of directors of the banks and the
adoption of professional corporate strategy and (5) review of main banking laws such as RBI
Act, Banking Regulation Act, SBI Act, etc. Recommendations were also made for better
technology, training of staff, and a higher professionalism level in banks. The impact of the
performance of banks after these measures were instituted is analyzed in Chapter III.
Box 2.1

Timeline of Banking Regulation in India

1850

1) Companies Act: Stipulated unlimited liability
for banks

1) Presidency Act:

1867

Prohibition of banks from dealing in risky foreign
bills
Prohibition from borrowing or lending from
abroad for more than six months
2) Amendment to the Companies Act: Permitted
principle of limited liability
1913

1) Amendment to the Companies Act and
repealing of the original Companies Act (1850)

1) Presidency Banks merged to create the Imperial

1921

Bank of India

18

1934

1) Reserve Bank of India Act established, and
outlined the powers of the Reserve Bank of India

1) RBI Companies Ordinance: Vested RBI with

1946

further monitoring powers
2) Banking Companies Act was established and
prevented branch expansion of banks and vested
RBI with further powers
1949

1) Banking Companies Act is revised to address
key issues of bank failure:
Vested RBI with the following powers:
i) supervision powers
ii) control over the establishment of new banks
and new branches
iii) power to inspect banking companies
It also focused on basic features such as protecting
interests of depositors

1) State Bank of India Act: Nationalized the

1955

Imperial Bank of India, and ownership was vested
with the Reserve Bank of India. The Imperial
Bank of India was renamed the State Bank of
India
1960

1) Eight more banks are nationalized, and are
integrated as subsidiaries of the State Bank of
India

Banking Companies Act is modified again to

1961

clarify and supplement the provisions under
Section 45 of the Banking Companies Act which
relates to compulsory reconstruction or
amalgamation of banks.
1962

1) Chapter IIIA in RBI Act: Changes in policy
regarding inspection of banks. RBI is now vested
with the power of making random inspections of
banks and their branches
2) New Branch Licensing Policy: Placed entry
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level norms on branch expansion

1) Deposit Insurance Corporation Act: Provided

1963

insurance cover against loss of all or part of
deposits with an insured bank
1964

1) RBI's powers over banks management is
increased. They have the ability to appoint and
remove banks' executive personnel

1) Credit Authorization Scheme: Commercial

1965

banks were required to obtain prior permission
from RBI for sanctioning any fresh working
capital limits above the prescribed norms
1968

1) National Credit Council was established to
help RBI allocate credit according to Five Year
Plan priorities

1) Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. was

1971

established for providing guarantees against risk
of default in payment
1973

1) Minimum lending rates prescibed on all loans
except for the priority sector

1) Maximum rate for bank loans was prescribed in

1976

the wake of the oil crisis
1980

1) Second wave of nationalization occurs where
six more banks are nationalized.

1) CRR raised by ten percentage points from 5.0%

1989

in1973 to 15.0% in 1989
1991

1) SLR raised by 12.5 percentage points from
26% in Februrary 1970 to 38.5% in September
1990
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Chapter 3: Impact of Reforms and Performance of Banks by Ownership
“Liberalization of the banking sector is a part of the internal liberalization of the
economy” (Roland 2006). Stabilization of the banking system occurs hand-in-hand with
liberalization, because it helps put the government owned banks in par with the new private and
foreign banks. Stabilization of the banking system refers to the recapitalization of state owned
banks, which helps reduce their non performing assets and increases the amount of existing
capitals in these banks. To ensure stabilization the government infused Rs. 40 billion in the state
owned banks before changing the policies for the banking sector. In the years from 1993 to 1999,
an additional Rs.120 billion was injected in the nationalized banks (Reserve Bank of India 2001).
India enacted four main reforms in 1991 and in 1998, which are described later in this chapter.
The impact of these reforms on the banking sector has been analyzed by many economists in the
past. In some studies, mentioned later in this chapter, the reforms are argued to have helped
increase efficiency and profitability but other studies find no such significant impact. This
chapter of the paper analyzes the impact of the reforms and the performance of the private and
public banks in the period before, during and after the Great Recession using the CAMEL
framework.

3.1 Outline of the main reforms in India in 1990
The four main reforms are briefly described below:
1) Reduction in CRR and SLR: The CRR and SLR stood at 15.0% of Net Demand and
Time Liabilities (NDTL) and 38.5% of NDTL, respectively in 1991. Together they
comprised 53.5% of NDTL. However by 2001 the government slowly reduced the CRR
to 8.0% of NDTL and the SLR to 25.0% of NDTL. Such high reserve requirements
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meant lower returns on these substantial investments that fell below the amount the banks
were paying to its depositors. Table 3.1 outlines the decrease in CRR and SLR over the
years 1974 to 2001.

Year

Table 3.1: CRR and SLR as % of NDTL
CRR (% of NDTL)
SLR (% of NDTL)

1974
1981
1987
1991
1994
1997
1999
2000
2001

4.0
7.5
10 (October)
15.0 (May)
15.0 (August)
10 (December)
9.0 (November)
8.5 (August)
8.0 (March) 7.5 (May)

33.0 (July)
35.0 (October)
37.5 (April)
38.5 (September, 1990)
31.5 (October)
25.0b (October)
25.0
25.0
25.0

2) Interest Rate Changes: The Government of India fixed lending rates and deposit rates
and reduced the interest margin slowly and gradually. In 1977 the ceiling on lending rates
was 16.50% and the floor on lending rates was 12.50%. The deposit rate was fixed at
8.00% -10.00% for varied lengths of deposits. In 1988 the ceiling on the lending rates
was still fixed at 16.50% and the deposit rates were increased to 9.0%-10%. The real
interest rate for loans was 7.115% and on deposits was (0.385%) - 0.615%. The
mandatory CRR and SLR deposits made with the government yielded 5.18%-6.47% for
varying periods in 1971 which increased to 7.03%-9.36% in 1988. The real interest rate
for government deposits in 1988 was (2.35%) - 0.025%. So the banks were making
substantially less than the lending rate or the amount they were paying to the depositors.
In addition to combat inflation the government of India changes the repo rate or the bank
rate. This changes the lending rates of the banks substantially in a shorter time span. The
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repo rate is the rate at which the RBI lends money to the banks. The government
decreased the repo rate after 1992 as well, decreasing the lending rate of the banks in
India. The recent increase in repo rates has been placed to curb increasing inflation in
India. The historical repo rates are outlined in Table 3.2
Table 3.2: Repo Rates in India
Year

1974

1981

1987

1991

1992

1997

2001

2007

2009

2011

Repo Rate (%)

9.00

10.00

10.00

11.00

12.00

9.00

6.50

7.75

4.75

8.50

3) Priority Sector Lending: The Narasimham Committee concluded that priority sector
advances were a key component of the losses in the state owned banks in India. The
recommendation of the committee was to reduce priority sector lending from 40% to
10% of net bank credit. However this recommendation was not taken into account and
the targets were not reduced; however the list of industries included in the priority sectors
has been expanded. As of 2011, the priority sector includes (1) agriculture, (2) small
scale industries, (3) small road and water transport operators, (4) small business, (5) retail
trade, (6) professional and self employed people, (7) state sponsored organizations for
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, (8) education, (9) housing, (10) consumption
loans, (11) micro-credit to self help groups and NGO‟s, (12) software industry, (13) food
and agro processing sector and (14) venture capital funds (Reserve Bank of India). The
limit for foreign banks is 32% and for domestic banks (private and public) is 40% of net
bank credit (Reserve Bank of India). The increase in the list of industries included in the
priority sector provides banks the freedom to advance loans to only credit worthy
industries.
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4) Introduction of Private and Foreign Banks: Entry of new foreign and domestic banks
started in 1994. Since then thirty new domestic and foreign banks have entered the Indian
market.
After these set of reforms were enacted, the Narasimham Committee submitted a second
report for another set of reforms in 1998. These reforms can be categorized into four main
groups: (1) strengthening the banking sector: (2) improving asset quality, (3) banking regulation
and supervision, (4) structure of banks. Based off the recommendations from the second report,
the government implemented the following changes.
1) Strengthening the Banking Sector: This entailed changing or drafting regulations that
would help improve performance measures for banks. The risk weights for the capital
adequacy ratio were changed. Government securities which were initially riskless now
held a weight of 2.5%. Minimum CRAR ratio was raised from 8% to 9%. This helped
measure the performance of banks in a more realistic setting, providing the markets with
a more accurate value of the banks.
2)

Improving Asset Quality: The Government of India changed the definition of doubtful
assets to be classified as doubtful if it was in the substandard category for 18 months; and
in March 2005 changed the definition to include assets in the substandard category for 12
months. For banks with a high NPA portfolio the government created the first Asset
Reconstruction Company in June 2002, this company would issue NPA swap bonds.

3) Banking Regulation and Supervision: Most banks have now established an
independent loan review system to identify and curb potential NPAs. The committee
suggested the need to redefine the scope of “external vigilance and investigation
agencies” (Major Recommendations by the 2nd Narasimham Committee on Banking
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Sector Reforms 2011) with regard to banking business; however, the government took no
action in this field.
4) Structure of Banks: A developmental financial institution6 over a period of time could
now convert itself into a bank. Another main recommendation taken into consideration
was to reduce the shareholding of the government in public banks to 33%, and banks
such as Punjab National Bank had started coming up with IPO‟s and most public banks
today are publicly traded on the stock exchanges of India.

3.2 Effects of these reforms on the private and public banking system
An obvious question that emerges from the reforms is whether or not they were helpful
for the Indian Banking system, and there exists a vast amount of literature that states that these
reforms were helpful in improving the efficiency of the Indian banks. Bhattacharya (1997)
conducted a study using 23 years of data from 1970-1992 and found that total factor productivity
was increasing at a rate of 2%, but during the deregulation period the growth rate for total factor
productivity was 7%, indicating that the reforms were effective in the early stages. Ram Mohan
and Ray (2004) conducted a study where they used 8 years of data from 1992 – 2000 and
concluded that there was a convergence in performance between public and private banks in the
post reform era and that public sector banks performed significantly better than private sector
banks in terms of revenue maximization efficiency. They allocate the superior performance of
the public banks to higher technical efficiency. A study done by the Reserve Bank of India
(2008) states that efficiency has improved across all bank groups over the period 1991-2007. The
report performs a comprehensive study on “resource mobilization, management of risk and
capital and lending and investment operation” of banks to come to this conclusion.
6

Developmental financial institutions is defined by the RBI as “an institution promoted or assisted by Government
mainly to provide development finance to one or more sectors or sub-sectors of the economy” (RBI, May 2004)
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The period from 1980 – 2010 has not been studied in the existing literature. This period is
interesting because two sets of reforms were introduced in the span of this 30 year period. This
period ensures enough time for the implementation and for the effects for these reforms to take
place. However, this paper analyzes the effects of the reforms on the profitability of these banks
over this period. The positive effect of these reforms on loans, savings, and other balance sheet
items has been studied by many notable economists in India and worldwide. As mentioned
above, economists have found positive effects from the reforms; however, very few studies have
focused on profitability of the banking sector. The two main publications used to gather all the
data were the Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy and Statistical Tables Relating to
Banks of India. RBI published a compilation of bank data for the past 30 years on March 3rd,
2011. This was the main source of data for all the regressions and ratios in this chapter. GDP
Growth Rate was downloaded from IMF‟s World Economic Outlook database. This section
analyzes the profitability of the banks in the wake of the first and the second set of reforms using
yearly data from 1980-2009.
Table 3.3 and 3.4 display the regression results for the profitability indicators on the
public and private banks. Equation (1) in table 3.3 and 3.4 suggests that CRR has a negative
relationship with return on assets (ROA) and is statistically significant. CRR affects private
banks more than public banks, a one percentage point increase in CRR will lead to a 1.02
percentage point decrease in ROA for private banks holding everything else constant; however a
one percentage point increase in CRR will decrease the ROA of public banks by only -0.3
percentage points, holding everything else constant.
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Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
CRR
SLR
GdpGrowth
Minimum_Lending_Rate
Constant
Observations
Adj. R-Squared

Table 3.3: Regression Results for Public Banks
ROA
ROE
Net Interest Margin to Assets
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.30**
(0.10)
-0.06
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.09)
0.35*
(0.16)

-0.34**
(0.09)
0.00
0.00
-0.03
(0.09)
0.29
(0.15)

0.06
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.05)
0.01
(0.08)
-0.05
(0.13)

-0.89
(1.84)
20
0.51

-21.08
(49.96)
20
0.51

4.92***
(1.36)
20
-0.03

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05;

Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
CRR
SLR
GdpGrowth
Minimum_Lending_Rate
Constant
Observations
Adj. R-Squared

Table 3.4: Regression Results for Private Banks
ROA
ROE
Net Interest Margin to Assets
(1)
(2)
(3)
-1.02**
(0.31)
-0.15
(0.20)
0.62*
(0.28)
0.9
(0.48)

-0.08*
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.06
(0.03)
0.09
(0.05)

-0.19*
(0.09)
-0.03
(0.06)
0.15
(0.08)
0.21
(0.13)

4.66
(4.96)
20
0.51

0.19
(0.55)
20
0.51

0.11
(1.38)
20
-0.03

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05;

Equation (2) in table 3.3 and 3.4 outlines the relationship between ROE and CRR. Since
the equity multiplier of the public banks is so high, the effect of CRR on ROE is greater on
public banks than on private banks. ROE and CRR have a strong negative relationship,
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statistically significant as well. If CRR decreases by one percentage point the ROE of public
banks should increase by 0.34 percentage points, and the ROE of private banks should increase
by 0.08 percentage points holding everything else constant. The ROA of public banks have a
positive relationship with the minimum lending rate, statistically significant at the 90% level. If
the minimum lending rate increases that will increase interest income for the banks and lead to a
higher net income which would lead to a higher return on assets. Equation (1) of table 3.3
suggests that a one percentage point increase in the minimum lending rate should increase the
ROA of public banks by 0.35 percentage points, holding everything else constant. Net Interest
Margin to Assets has a negative relationship with CRR statistically significant at the 5% level, as
stated by equation (3) in table 3.4. For a one percentage point increase in CRR the net interest
margin to assets ratio will decrease by 0.19 percentage points holding everything else constant.
The reforms in 1991 that helped decrease the CRR and the SLR were definitely profitable for the
private and public banks, as they helped increase the profitability of the banking industry of
India. 7

3.3 Comparison of private and public banks using the CAMEL framework
This section of the paper analyzes the comparison of the private and public sector banks
based on performance indicators. The CAMEL Framework which helps measure banks
performance through five different categories is broadly used to help measure performance. The
CAMEL Framework is distributed as (1) capital adequacy ratio, (2) asset quality, (3)
management quality, (4) earnings performance, and (5) assessing liquidity (Asian Development
Bank 2005).

7

A regression analysis of the effect of these reforms on loans alone was performed and nothing was found
statistically significant so they were not reported.
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The capital adequacy ratio measures the financial strength of a financial institution.
Section 17 of Indian Banking Regulation Act (1949) states that every banking company in India
is required to create a reserve fund and it should hold at least 20% of the firms‟ disclosed profits
in the fund (RBI Publication). However prior to the reforms in 1991 there existed no measure of
measuring the financial strength of banks in India. One of the many suggestions of the
Narasimham Committee was to initiate a capital to risk asset system. The Basel Committee
released guidelines on capital measures and standards in July 1988. These guidelines were
implemented in India in 1992 (RBI, 2000). Starting from March 2000 Indian banks were
required to maintain CAR at 9% and it is 10% for new private banks and banks undertaking. The
guidelines for capital and risk weighted assets have been outlined in detail by the Reserve Bank
of India.
Figure 3.1 below displays the capital adequacy ratio of private and public banks in India.
It shows that the public and private sector banks were closely following each other at an average
of approximately 12% and during the recession there is a sharp discrepancy in the ratio between
public and private banks. The CAR increases if riskless assets such as cash and investments in
government securities increase or if capital increases. The capital adequacy ratio for private
banks could have increased as cash in hand and balances with RBI increased by 73% in 2007;
however the increase was only 19% for public banks (RBI). A higher CAR displays greater
financial strength for an institution. After the crisis the private banks seem to be performing
better if measured in terms of financial strength.
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Figure 3.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio
18.00
16.00

14.00
12.00
10.00
2001

2002

2003

2004

Public Sector Banks

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Private Sector Banks

The asset quality of a bank can be assessed by concentration of loans to different
industries, the number of non-performing assets (NPA‟s) and loans and loan loss provision ratio.
The ratio of priority sector advances is monitored by the government and has a floor of 40% of
net bank credit for private and public banks in India and 32% for foreign banks operating in
India. Figure 3.3 graphs non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets. However upon
closer examination of these advances in 2010, the percentage of NPA to total assets increases by
13.81% for public banks whereas it decreases by 6.93% for private banks. The private and public
banks closely follow each other till 2009 and start diverging after that. In Figure 3.4 the
composition of NPA‟s by sector is graphed. The number of nonperforming assets from priority
sector for public banks increases to 66.8% and only 32% come from non-priority sectors (RBI).
Public banks, of which the government of India still has a majority stake, are not forced to lend
to the government for its own projects because the percentage of NPA‟s from public sector for
public banks is at a mere 2% at its maximum. However the priority sector and the non priority
sector composition of NPA‟s which was diverging from 2005 – 2008 now seems to be
converging.
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Figure 3.2 Ratio of Priority Sector Advances to Total Advances
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Figure 3.3 NPA as a % of Assets
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Figure 3.4 Compostion of NPA's for Public Sector Banks
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Assessing management quality can be a very challenging task, so the metrics used in the
CAMEL framework to assess it are: operating costs and operating profits. Figure 3.5 below
displays percentage of operating profits to total assets. It is evident that public banks had higher
31

operating profits as compared to the private sector banks. However, private banks show an
upward trend before and after the crisis and the public banks show a downward trend before and
after the crisis. So based of this metric the management of the public firms by the Government of
India, is not really healthy for the banks. In Figure 3.6 the ratio of wage bills to total income
suggests that the public sector banks are making their operations more efficient with time, and
are coming closer to the ratio exhibited by the private banks. Although in Figure 3.7 operating
expenses as a percentage of total expenses show a downward trend from 2006 -2009, an upward
trend develops after 2009, this may reflect the effects of the financial crisis. Further breakdown
of operating expenses in the years 2007-2009 reveals that payments to and provisions for
employees in private banks increases on average by 28% whereas in public banks the average
increase is only 10%. The biggest increase in operating expenses is the law charges for private
banks which increase by 46% on average in 2007-2009. For public banks the largest increase on
average is 25% in advertisement and publicity. In addition the total contribution of employee
payments and provisions declines in private banks from 66.65% to 39.15% and in public banks
the decline is only 6.17%.

Figure 3.5 Ratio of Operating Profits to Total Assets (%)
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of Wage Bills to Total Income
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Figure 3.7 Operating Expenses as a % of Total Expenses
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All the categories of the CAMEL Framework are closely linked and effectively measure
a bank‟s performance. To assess the earnings performance of a bank, it will be helpful to look at
a variety of ratios and measures; these include: (1) return on equity (ROE), (2) return on assets
(ROA) and (3) net interest margin to total assets.
Return on equity helps measure the firm‟s profitability by measuring the amount of profit
a firm generates with the money invested by shareholders. Figure 3.8 graphs the return on equity
of private and public banks. Return on equity is increasing for both private and public banks till
2006, however after 2006 they start diverging, and private banks display a downward trend and
public banks display an upward trend. Return on Equity can be further broken down into three
more components, by the DuPont Analysis technique, to help understand the difference in the
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ratio between two different companies in the same industry or within different industries
(Hitchner, 2011). The DuPont model was created by F. Donaldson Brown an electrical engineer.
It is a technique that is used to examine the profitability of a company by integrating the
elements of the income statement with the balance sheet. It can be broken in three main parts: (1)
profit margin, (2) asset turnover, and (3) and equity multiplier.

Profit Margin
Private Banks
Public Banks
Difference

Asset Turnover
Private Banks
Public Banks
Difference

Equity Multiplier
Private Banks
Public Banks

2000 2001 2002
8.65% 7.00% 8.55%
4.28% 3.27% 6.70%
4.37% 3.73% 1.85%

Table 3.5: Profit Margin
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
9.21% 10.50% 10.83% 11.48% 10.45% 10.82% 10.56%
9.78% 12.75% 10.72% 10.48% 10.87% 10.75% 10.69%
-0.57% -2.25% 0.11% 1.00% -0.42% 0.07% -0.13%

Table 3.6: Asset Turnover
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
10.37% 10.16%
7.78% 10.71% 9.03%
10.26% 10.23% 10.26% 10.06% 9.29%
0.11% -0.07% -2.48% 0.65% -0.26%

2000
703.1
2408.7

2001
789.5
2512.3

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
7.63% 7.58% 8.30% 9.36% 10.02%
7.94% 7.63% 7.65% 8.14%
8.46%
-0.31% -0.05% 0.65% 1.22% 1.56%

Table 3.7: Equity Multiplier
2002
2003
2004
2005
983.6
957.2
993.0
874.5
2438.2 2402.3 2328.0 2296.2

2006
1532.9
1831.6

2007
1580.7
1922.0

2008
2009
1326.0 1076.2
1954.3 1996.1

The DuPont Analysis suggests, that the reason public banks return on equity is higher than
private banks is because their equity multiplier is higher. The asset turnover of public banks is
lower than private banks and the profit margin is almost the same. Return on assets helps
measure profitability of a company relative to its total assets. It is an indicator of the
management‟s efficiency in using its assets to generate earnings. Figure 3.9 displays that
nationalized banks have a better ROA as compared to private banks pre crisis. Post 2007 the
ROA of public sector banks declines and private sector banks see a sharp increase in their ROA,
which they maintain through the crisis and appear above the public sector banks.
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Net interest margin to total assets measure the profitability of the bank‟s lending and
borrowing activities. Once again as displayed by Figure 3.10 public banks outperform the private
banks earlier on. As soon as the crisis hits, however, we see a sharp decline in the net interest
margin ratio of public banks whereas, private banks are still able to maintain their growth and
continue their rise through the crisis.

Figure 3.8 Return on Equity
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Figure 3.9 Return on Assets
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Figure 3.10 Net Interest Margin to Total Assets
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Figure 3.11 Loan to Deposit Ratio
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The last element measured by the CAMEL framework is liquidity. A financial institution
must be liquid to meet the demand of creditors and depositors. Liquidity directly arises from the
four factors of CAMEL mentioned above. Liquidity has an inverse relationship with
profitability; therefore a financial institution must strike a balance between the two elements.
Liquidity is usually measured by the current ratio or the quick ratio. Liquidity is directly related
to holdings of cash and other assets that can be converted into cash within a year. Upon analysis
of the Loan to Deposit Ratio it is displayed in Figure 3.11 that private banks loan Rs.0.55 and
public sector banks loan Rs.0.40 for every rupee of deposit. The private and public sector banks
start out at 20% in 1999; private banks are issuing more loans per rupee of deposit compared to
public banks. The CAMEL Framework provides a holistic view on the performance of the banks.
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Chapter 4: Share Price Performance of the Indian Banking Industry
Relative to the World
This section analyzes the Indian Banking Sector‟s performance relative to the banking
sectors of other developed and developing nations. The comparison set is Hong Kong, Europe
and USA. For the comparison, stock price and index price data was downloaded from
Bloomberg. The four banking indices used are: (1) Stoxx 600 Banking Index (SX7P), (2) Hang
Seng Finance Index (HSF), (3) CNX Banking Index (CNX Bank), and (4) S&P Banking Index
(S5BANKX). The four main market indices used are: (1) Stoxx Europe 600 (SXXP), (2) Hang
Seng Index (HSI), (3) BSE India Sensex 30 Index (SENSEX) and (4) S&P 500 Index (SXP).
There are two main stock exchanges in India, the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The Sensex is an index composed of the stocks of the BSE, and
the BSE Banking Index tracks the performance of the leading banking sector stocks listed on the
BSE.
The CNX Bank Index tracks the performance of the most liquid and large capitalized
Indian Banking Stocks. The index comprises of 12 stocks that trade on the NSE. A bank can list
on both the exchanges, and the reason for choosing the CNX Bank Index over the BSE
BANKEX is because the CNX bank Index was developed as of January 1, 2000 and the BSE
BANKEX was developed as of January 1st, 2002. CNX Bank allows the analysis of the
performance of the index for 10 years rather than 8 years in the case of BANKEX Index. All the
indices are converted into log growth rates to assure stationarity. There is an existence of a
dummy variable that helps us look at the relationship between the Indian Banking Indices and
the Hong Kong, Europe and American Banking Indices. The dummy variable takes the value of
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1 after June 10th, 2007 when Bear Sterns suspends redemption. The variables are described
below in Table 4.1. The regressions are listed as follows:

+

Table 4.1: Description of Variables
Variables

Description
Dependent Variables

cnxbank_lng

Log Difference of CNX Bank Index
Independent Variables

indexbank_lng Log Difference of Index
index_d0

Dummy variable interaction indicating values after June 10th 2007

Time

A time variable accounting for time trend

cnxbank_lag

Lagged Dependent Variable calculated as the previous weeks value of the index

datedummy

Dummy variable taking the value 1 for the period June 10th 2007 – Oct 9th 2011

Figure 4.1 and 4.2 graphically illustrate the relationships between the various banking indices.
Figure 4.1 normalizes the bank indices to 100 to better analyze the way the CNX Bank Index tracks the
other banking indices. The CNX Bank Index is on the left vertical axis and the other three indices are
graphed on the right vertical axis. The vertical axis is graphing the price of the indices normalized to a
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starting point of 100. It seems as though the Indian banks are tracking the banking indices of the other
countries only after 2007, because the upward trend is not similar to the varying trends of the other
banking indices. However, it is clear, that after the crisis the CNX Bank Index is following the HSF Index
very closely and the relationship between the two indices gets stronger. It appears that the CNX Bank
Index begins to track the S5bankX and the SX7P indices after 2007. Another important takeaway from
Figure 4.1 is the exponential growth in the Indian Banking Industry.
Figure 4.1: Bank Indices
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Figure 4.2: CNX Bank Index vs. Market Indices
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Figure 4.2 graphs the CNX Bank Index against the other countries‟ overall market
indices. The SXP Index and the SXXP Index‟s prices are on the right vertical axis and the
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other indices are graphed on the left vertical axis. The CNX Bank Index follows the Sensex
very closely as one would expect. It is also noticeable that the CNX Bank follows the Hang
Seng Index closely and the relationship gets stronger after 2007. In addition, it looks as if the
CNX Bank Index starts tracking the S&P 500 very closely after the year 2007. However a
graphical analysis should be followed by an empirical analysis to help confirm the
movements and relationships displayed.
Table 4.2 displays the correlation between CNX Bank Index, and the market indices
of developed and developing countries over two time periods. The first time period,
represented by d0, is from Jan 2000- Jun, 2007 and the second, represented by d1, is from
June, 2007 – Oct, 2011. The correlation table shows that over time, the correlation between
all the indices and the CNX Bank Index increases. The Hang Seng Index has the highest
correlation with the CNX Bank Index.
Table 4.2 Correlation
cnxbank_lng
cnxbank_lng
stoxx_d0
hsi_d0
S&P_d0
stoxx_d1
hsi_d1
S&P_d1

1
0.18*
0.21*
0.16*
0.36*
0.45*
0.33*

* denotes 5% significance level

To perform empirical analysis, a multivariate linear regression is performed, with the
log growth in the price of the CNX Bank Index as the dependent variable. Table 4.3 helps
explain the relationships between the banking indices and the overall market indices of U.S.,
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Europe, and Hong Kong and the CNX Bank Index.
Table 4.3 : Bank Index Regression Result
Dependent Variable: Log Growth of CNX Bank Index
Independent Variables
(1)
hkbank_lng
Stoxx bank_lng
S&PBank_lng

(2)

0.48***
(-0.07)
0.22***
(-0.07)
-0.01
(-0.04)

Stoxx_lng

Time

0.00
(0.00)

0.21
(0.11)
0.53***
(-0.06)
0.05
(-0.11)
0.00
(0.00)

Cnxbank(-1)

-0.02
(0.04)
0.00
0.00

-0.02
(0.04)
0.00
0.00

612
0.23

612
0.23

hk_lng
S&P_lng

Constant

Observations
Adjusted R Squared

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05;

Equation (1) in Table 4.3 shows the regression for the relationship between the CNX
Bank Index and the bank indices of the other countries. There is a strong relationship between
the Hang Seng Finance Index (HSF) and the CNX Bank Index, significant at the 0.1% level.
There is a similarly strong relationship between the CNX Bank index and the Stoxx 600 Banking
Index (SX7P), again significant at the 0.1% level. This indicates that Indian banks tend to follow
the trends of both the Hong Kong and European banking sectors. The magnitude of the
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relationship is greater with respect to the Hong Kong banking index; a 10 percentage point
increase in the HSF index produces a 4.8 percentage point increase in the CNX Bank Index
Table 4.4 describes the relationship of the HSF Index with the bank indices of the other
countries in the set. Equation (1) in Table 4.4 suggests that a one percentage point increase in the
SX7P index produces a 0.45 percentage point increase in the HSF index, indicating a better
integration of the Hong Kong banking index with the banking indices of other developed
countries. By comparison, equation (1) in Table 4.3 results has the CNX Bank Index increasing
only by 0.22 percentage points for a one percentage point increase in the SX7P index.
Meanwhile equation (2) in Table 4.3 suggests that a one percentage point increase in the Hang
Seng Index has the CNX Bank Index increasing by 0.53 percentage points.
Table 4.4 : Bank Index Regression Result
Dependent Variable: HSF Index
Independent Variables

stoxxBank_lng
S&PBank _lng
cnxbank_lng
Time
hkBank(-1)
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R Squared

(1)

(2)

0.45***
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)
0.17***
(0.02)
0.00

0.53**
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)

(0.00)
0.03
(0.03)

(0.00)
0.05
(0.03)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

612
0.46

612
0.42

0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Equation (1) in Table 4.3 shows the strong relationship between the Hang Seng Finance Index
and the CNX Bank Index, significant at the 0.1% level. This indicates that Indian banks stock
prices are affected by the share prices of the Hong Kong banks. Such a finding is not surprising
given the importance of the banking sector in Hong Kong. In the regressions performed in Table
4.3, the Indian banks are clearly highly correlated with the overall Indian stock market, and the
overall Indian market index had to be omitted because of high multicollinearity.
Table 4.5 : Bank Index Regression Result
Dependent Variable: CNX Bank Index
Independent Variables
(1)
hkBank
stoxxBank_lng
S&PBank_lng
hkBank_d0
stoxxBank_d0
S&PBank_d0
Time
Cnxbank(-1)
datedummy
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-Squared

0.48***
(0.07)
0.24***
(0.07)
-0.01
(0.05)
0.12
(0.09)
-0.00
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.05)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.04)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
612
0.23

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 4.5 shows the regression output for the bank index with a dummy variable breaking
the series into two time periods, each side of the 2007 onset of the financial crisis. The results
suggest that there has been no shift in the relationship between the Indian and the Hong Kong
and European banking indices before and after June 10th 2007. Even though Figure 4.1 and Table
4.2 suggest that the CNX Bank Index starts tracking the Hong Kong and European banks more
closely after 2007, this is not corroborated by the regression results. The post 2007 interactive
dummy for the HSF Index and the Stoxx Banking Index is not statistically significant. The
regression suggests that if the HSF index increases by ten percentage points the CNX Bank
Index should increase by 4.8 percentage points holding everything else constant. The relationship
of the CNX Bank Index with the European banks is also statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
A ten percentage point shift in the European banking index, would induct a 2.4 percentage point
shift in the Indian banking index. The relationship between Indian and European banks suggests
that the Hong Kong banks have a larger effect on Indian banks than the European banks. The
weak relationship with the European banks and no relationship with the banking industry of
USA, suggests that the banking industry of India, is not as integrated with the US bank stock
prices to experience shifts in its stock prices with a shift in the US banks stock prices. So even
though the Indian banks are becoming more global, they still have to integrate with the banking
industry of developed countries such as the USA.
Table 4.6 shows the regression output for the Indian bank index against the overall
indices of the Hong Kong, European and US stock markets, with the same set of post 2007
dummies. As time moves on, the Indian banking index displays a stronger positive relationship
with the overall Hong Kong stock market. In the period 2000-2007, a ten percentage point shift
in the Hang Seng Index would induct a 3.3 percentage point shift in the CNX Bank Index
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holding everything else constant, significant at the 0.1% level. After 2007 the relationship gets
stronger and a ten percentage point increase in the Hang Seng index leads to a 7.4 percentage
point increase in the CNX Bank index, holding everything constant, significant at the 0.1% level.
Table 4.6 : Bank Index Regression Result
Dependent Variable: CNX Bank Index
Independent Variables
(1)
Stoxx_lng
hk_lng
S&P_lng
Stoxx_d0
hk_d0
S&P_d0
Time
cnxbank_lag
datedummy
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-Squared

0.17
(0.16)
0.32***
(0.09)
0.09
(0.14)
0.15
(0.22)
0.41**
(0.13)
-0.22
(0.22)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.04)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
611
0.25

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The overall stock markets of Europe and USA have no effect on the Indian Banking
Index, over a period of ten years, however the relationship of the banking industry of India is
strengthening with stock markets of developing countries such as Hong Kong. This indicates that
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the Indian banking system may indeed be integrating globally with the banking sectors of other
countries; however the stock markets of developed countries still have no impact on the banking
industry of India. The Indian banking industry is integrating globally at a slower pace than its
growth in India in the span of ten years.
The Indian banking industry is still developing. Even though it has been present for many
centuries, the banking industry is not as well developed as banking industries in more developed
countries; however, it is developing and growing at an exponential growth. As can be seen in
Figure 4.1 average Indian banks share prices increase almost tenfold in the period from 2000 –
2008. Usually financial and economic growth goes hand in hand, and there are lots of studies that
suggest that one precedes the development of the other. Rosseau and Sylla (2003) and Levine
(1997) argue in various papers, that financial development leads to economic growth. A study
done by Tennant, Kirton, and Abdulkadri (2010) develops proxies for Levine‟s five functions of
the financial sector and models the relationship between these five functions (Levine 1997) and
economic growths. The study finds that policy makers should not expect instant results from
policies and or financial reforms; they have statistically significant results on long term GDP
growth but none on short term growth. Considering the fact that India implemented its reforms in
1991 and another set in 1998, it is not surprising to see a tenfold growth in the Indian banking
industry as compared to other developing and developed nations.
Returning to India‟s growth story after comparing it to a set of other countries, Figure
4.3 suggests that the banking index of India is in line with the individual share price performance
of most banks, however Axis Bank in Figure 4.3 outperforms all the other banks with a 600
times increase in its value over the course of ten years. It also has the largest drop in the wake of
the crisis, but manages to reach a record high, within a year of its drop. Upon even further
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analysis, there are four top performing banks, Axis Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, Bank of India,
and Punjab National Bank that outdo the average. Axis Bank and Kotak Mahindra Bank are
private players in the industry. Punjab National Bank and the Bank of India are public banks.
The CNX Bank index is actually an underrepresentation of the banking industry of India. It does
not capture the full growth of the top players in the banking industry.
Figure 4.3: Individual Stock Price Growth vs. CNX Bank Index Growth
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Indian banks might be experiencing exponential growth; however they are still tracking
the main banking indices in their movements. Figure 4.2 shows that even though the Indian bank
index started off with a marked difference from the other banking indices, however, by 2007 it
had started following the trends of the other banking indices, the Hong Kong banking index in
particular. Figure 4.2 is helpful in illustrating the growth of the Indian banking index, and the
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increase in convergence after 2007 as shown by the regression results above. It can be said that
the Indian banking industry is today in its developing stages and is experiencing massive growth
and will become more globally integrated in the years to come, if it continues to reform and grow
at the same speed it is today.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

The Indian banking sector has undergone various stages of development, starting in the
18th century, from a period of frequent failures to a more stable banking system, to one that was
nationalized in the 1960‟s, to one that became unprofitable in the 1990‟s, to one that is today
experiencing exponential growth in the 21st century. The Indian banking sector has performed
very well in the past ten years based on the metrics of the CAMEL framework and the data
analysis. In addition, it is now more affected by shifts in the banking sectors and the overall
stock markets of other developed countries. The Indian banking sector is still developing and has
a long way to go. It is not as mature as the banking systems of the developed nations. It still does
not feature in the top fifty banks in the world, published by the Bankers Almanac. Interestingly,
six Chinese banks are featured on this list. Thus, even though both China and India are fast paced
developing countries, the Chinese banking system, is more massive in size and somewhat more
concentrated in a few very large players, than the Indian system.
Privatization and liberalization has benefitted the Indian banking system, with gains
accruing to public and private banks alike. Public banks have performed very well according to
the CAMEL Framework and have performed better than private banks in some instances. Two of
the four largest growing banks in India are public banks. However, this paper finds that the
private banks perform better than the public banks on all measures of the CAMEL Framework,
so even though the public banks have come a long way, they have a long way to go to compete
with the operational efficiency levels of private banks. In addition, this thesis finds that the
Indian banks have recovered from the crisis and most of the private banks are displaying an
upward trend in terms of profitability and liquidity.
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The analysis of the CNX Bank Index against other country‟s indices, leads us to believe,
that the Indian banking industry is slowly integrating with other countries‟ banking sectors. The
Indian banking industry is linked closely to both the Hong Kong and the European banking
industries in terms of share price. In addition, the Indian banking industry‟s relationship with the
Hong Kong overall stock market has strengthened over the years. However, there is no
significant relationship with the US Stock Market or the US Banking Index.
However, despite this phenomenal growth and recovery from the Great Recession, Indian
banks have a long way to go. One of the most important tasks is to improve operating efficiency
while optimizing operating costs, by improving technology and catching up with foreign banks.
There is scope for further research on the exponential growth of the Indian banks. In addition the
private banks experienced even higher growth than most public banks in the same time span. It
will be very interesting to know what particular factors caused such rapid growth in the Indian
banking industry. Two questions that arise out of the last section are: (1) can Indian banks attain
global size? and (2) should they aspire to this? According to the Reserve Bank of India, latest
report on the performance of the Indian Banking Industry, Indian banks will not make it to the
top ten banks in the world even after consolidation of the few biggest banks in India.
Competition for customers has increased, as the public banks no longer have the upper hand
arising from being the only banks in India. Deregulations on minimum lending rate and the
recent deregulation on October 25th, 2011 of the savings deposit interest rates, will lead to further
competition.
With more globalization, deregulation, the banking system is becoming more complex
riskier. Thus, this thesis gives way to questions that require further research.
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